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Self-generated thoughts unrelated to ongoing activities, also known as “mind-wandering,”
make up a substantial portion of our daily lives. Reports of such task-unrelated
thoughts (TUTs) predict both poor performance on demanding cognitive tasks and
blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) activity in the default mode network (DMN).
However, recent findings suggest that TUTs and the DMN can also facilitate metacognitive
abilities and related behaviors. To further understand these relationships, we examined the
influence of subjective intensity, ruminative quality, and variability of mind-wandering on
response inhibition and monitoring, using the Error Awareness Task (EAT). We expected
to replicate links between TUT and reduced inhibition, and explored whether variance in
TUT would predict improved error monitoring, reflecting a capacity to balance between
internal and external cognition. By analyzing BOLD responses to subjective probes and
the EAT, we dissociated contributions of the DMN, executive, and salience networks to
task performance. While both response inhibition and online TUT ratings modulated BOLD
activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) of the DMN, the former recruited a more
dorsal area implying functional segregation. We further found that individual differences
in mean TUTs strongly predicted EAT stop accuracy, while TUT variability specifically
predicted levels of error awareness. Interestingly, we also observed co-activation of
salience and default mode regions during error awareness, supporting a link between
monitoring and TUTs. Altogether our results suggest that although TUT is detrimental
to task performance, fluctuations in attention between self-generated and external
task-related thought is a characteristic of individuals with greater metacognitive monitoring
capacity. Achieving a balance between internally and externally oriented thought may thus
aid individuals in optimizing their task performance.
Keywords: thought-sampling, response inhibition, error monitoring, mind-wandering, metacognition, variability,
neurophenomenology
INTRODUCTION
Our day-to-day lives are rich with thoughts and feelings that
emerge without a direct relationship to the here and now. So-
called “task-unrelated thoughts” (TUTs) can be quite variable in
content. We might think about our dinner plans while waiting for
the bus, or rehearse an important speech in the shower. These self-
generated experiences are unique insofar as they are not derived
directly from an external stimulus; rather they form a train of
endogenous thoughts, perceptually decoupled from ongoing sen-
sory information and any task being performed (Smallwood,
2013). While such thoughts presumably facilitate goal-oriented
behavior over longer time frames, they can also interfere with
cognitive performance of tasks in the moment, for example when
worrying about a negative social interaction causes us to forget to
stop for groceries on the way home fromwork. An interesting and
underexplored question is how TUTs both facilitate and inter-
fere with behavior, and the underlying brain processes supporting
these interactions.
Large-scale thought sampling studies investigating the context
and intensity of TUTs suggest that self-generated thoughts may
comprise a large part of our daily mental activity (Killingsworth
and Gilbert, 2010) and have a complex relationship to psycho-
logical well-being, relating to both costs and benefits (Smallwood
and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). For example, while increased TUT
intensity is commonly reported in attention-deficit disorder and
negative affect (Weyandt et al., 2003; Smallwood et al., 2007b;
McVay et al., 2008; Marchetti et al., 2012), TUT-related benefits
for cognition included creativity (Baird et al., 2012), an enhanced
memory for personally relevant information (Smallwood et al.,
2011), the opportunity to plan for the future (Baird et al.,
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2011), and a style of decision-making characterized by patience
(Smallwood et al., 2013a). One important question in investi-
gations of self-generated thought is therefore what determines
whether for a given individual or context, TUT is associated with
costs or benefits.
Investigating self-generated thoughts presents particular
methodological difficulties, as their spontaneous nature renders
direct experimental manipulation problematic. An established
method used in the present investigation is to study the experi-
ence of TUTs while people perform an external task; an advantage
of this approach is that the experiential reports can be validated
by a process of triangulation using behavioral, physiological,
and subjective measures recorded during the session (Jack and
Roepstorff, 2002; Schooler, 2002). Neuroimaging studies have
revealed that self-generated cognition is linked to functional
activity in the posterior cingulate (pCC) and medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), central hubs of the default mode network (DMN)
(Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009). The DMN is a con-
stellation of cortical regions also including mPFC, pCC, and
inferior parietal cortex (Greicius et al., 2003; Hampson et al.,
2006; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Anticevic et al., 2010) that
reliably deactivates during cognitively demanding tasks.
While functional connectivity studies suggest that the DMN
may be “anti-correlated” with the salience and control related
networks (Fox et al., 2005; although see Murphy et al., 2009 for
critique), the network also participates in a variety of functional
processes important for self-regulation including prospection,
episodic memory, and social cognition (Buckner and Carroll,
2007). Several functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies have implicated activity in the mPFC and the pCC specif-
ically with self-reports of mind-wandering, including one study
that found that when participants reported being more aware
of their mind-wandering, executive and DMN nodes co-activate
(Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011).
Correlation between the control and DMN is also observed dur-
ing autobiographical planning (Spreng et al., 2010). The extent
and nature of interactions between these networks and their
contribution to the costs and benefits of TUTs is currently unclear.
Consistent with a general functional role of self-generated
thought, the mPFC is typically activated when thinking about the
self and when making judgments about others (Mitchell, 2009).
In addition, the medial and rostral-lateral portion of the PFC are
also implicated in social cognition and metacognitive problem
solving (Burgess et al., 2007; Dumontheil et al., 2010a,b) and indi-
vidual differences in the volume of the rostral-lateral PFC predict
metacognitive ability (Fleming et al., 2010). Metacognition sup-
ports flexible problem solving, and is thought to both monitor
and control internal and external attention (Flavell, 1979; Fleming
et al., 2012). Consistent with this notion, a recent resting state
study by Baird et al. (2013) demonstrated that the medial sec-
tion of the frontal pole shows increased functional integration
with regions of the DMN for individuals with greater metacog-
nitive performance on a memory task, while lateral regions of
the mPFC predicted improved metacognition of perceptual pro-
cesses. Together evidence for both self-generated thought and
metacognition converge on the notion that the mPFC supports
such processes, including those necessary to navigate complex
social interactions (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith,
2012). Metacognitive monitoring enables an individual to correct
problems in task performance, facilitating flexible responses. As
such, a key aim of the current experiment was to both replicate the
well-documented impairment of task performance by TUTs and
also establish whether the monitoring of concurrent performance
might be similarly impaired.
Error monitoring in the context of response inhibition is an
extensively researched metacognitive ability, beginning with early
work suggesting that correction of errors can occur as early as
200ms post-error, before conscious awareness of having commit-
ted a mistake (Rabbitt, 1966, 2002). Although a variety of experi-
mental methods exist for eliciting awareness of errors, a common
difficulty relates to eliciting sufficient aware and unaware errors
for comparison, due to an inverse relationship between task dif-
ficulty and awareness (e.g., participants typically make few errors
with high overall awareness on easy tasks, or many errors with
little awareness on difficult tasks). One effective experimental
paradigm is the Error Awareness Task (EAT) in which a partic-
ipant must inhibit their responses according to two competing
stimulus rules (Hester et al., 2005, 2009, 2012; O’Connell et al.,
2009). Prior studies have shown that awareness of errors in the
EAT depends upon a distributed neural network including ante-
rior insula, cingulate cortices, and medial frontal gyrus (Hester
et al., 2005, 2012; Ullsperger et al., 2010). Here we used the
EAT to distinguish the contributions of particular neural sys-
tems, including the salience and DMNs, to task performance,
error monitoring, and TUTs. Additionally, we explored whether
particular aspects of mind-wandering, such as its intensity and
variability, would predict error monitoring performance.
To measure the experience of TUT we embedded experi-
ence sampling probes within the EAT, prompting participants to
rate the subjective intensity of TUTs in the preceding interval.
Previous investigations have utilized this approach in both behav-
ioral (Mrazek et al., 2012) and neuroimaging (Christoff et al.,
2009) research. Although it is unclear whether TUTs should be
treated as a continuous or dichotomous state (although see Schad
et al., 2012 for evidence of the former), our approach allows
the estimation of the intensity of subjective experience within a
given period. This offers the advantage of a metric that combines
both the temporal occurrence and subjective intensity of different
aspects of mind-wandering. We also explored a phenomenologi-
cal distinction concerning the self-absorbing nature of TUTs. To
do so, participants were trained to rate both the intensity of TUTs
and the subjective “stickiness” of these experiences. We defined
TUT stickiness as recurring thoughts that absorb attention or
meta-awareness beyond their intrinsic frequency. Our aim was
to dissociate the intensity of TUTs from their ability to absorb
awareness, leading to rumination.
In addition to examining overall TUT and stickiness rates,
we were also interested in the variability of these experiences.
Within-subject variability reflects important dynamical aspects
of cognition and experience, reflecting discrete state transitions
(Varela et al., 2001; Lutz et al., 2002). While analysis of self-
reported mean TUT yields information relating to the contents
of introspective subjective awareness, we reasoned that variabil-
ity in TUT report usage might reflect underlying trends in TUT
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experience not necessarily open to direct self-report. Previous
research has demonstrated a link between reaction time variabil-
ity during sustained attention tasks and attentional instability
(Larson and Alderton, 1990; Stuss et al., 1994; Hultsch et al.,
2002). Increased reaction time variability during sustained atten-
tion tasks is also predictive of psychopathology; people with
ADHD typically show alterations on RT variance even when there
are no discernable differences in mean RT (Leth-Steensen et al.,
2000; Vaurio et al., 2009; Epstein et al., 2011). However, variabil-
ity of reaction time can also be adaptive, for instance in slowing
responses following error awareness (Shalgi et al., 2007), and vari-
ation in RT is reduced following intensive attention training (Lutz
et al., 2009). Following commission errors participants rapidly
decelerate motor responses (e.g., post-error slowing). This source
of RT variability is thought to reflect flexible monitoring behav-
ior, and is reduced both in patients with ADHD (Shiels et al.,
2012) and following a negative mood induction—a period when
the intensity of TUTs increase (Smallwood et al., 2009). As self-
generated thought has both costs and benefits (Smallwood and
Andrews-Hanna, 2013), it is conceivable that a highly variable
style of thinking in which neither TUT nor task-related thought
unduly dominate cognition could support flexible and adaptive
cognitive performance.
In summary, the present experiment examined the relation-
ship amongst within- and between-subject variability in TUT
intensity and stickiness, response inhibition accuracy, and the
awareness of consequent mistakes. Based on prior research, we
expected increased TUT to be associated with worse inhibi-
tion performance and to engage prefrontal nodes of the DMN.
The main focus of the experiment, however, was to ascertain
the relationship between TUT and metacognition, which was
assessed by measuring self-reported stickiness and error mon-
itoring. One possibility is that better metacognition increases
the ability to regulate mind-wandering (Schooler, 2002) and
so for motivated participants under demanding conditions,
the capacity to detect errors should correlate with reduced
TUT. Alternatively, if TUT variability reflects flexible shifting
between internal and external information, balancing both self-
generated and perceptually directed thought, then we expected
to find greater variability in TUT associated with increased error
awareness.
METHODS
STUDY PARTICIPANTS
42 participants (27 females) were recruited from an online par-
ticipant pool system in Aarhus, Denmark, from both the local
university and community. The average age of participants was
34.8 years (±0.9 SEM, range = 25–47 years), with 17.6 mean
years education (±0.5 SEM, range = 10–23 years). All proce-
dures were approved by the local research ethics committee, De
Videnskabsetiske Komitéer for RegionMidtjylland, in accordance
with the declaration of Helsinki. As part of a separate investiga-
tion concerning the impact of mindfulness on EAT and visual
sensitivity, half of our participants (n = 21) were mindfulness
meditation practitioners recruited locally using flyers and an
online participant pool (Sona-Systems Experiment Management
Software).
Here we were specifically interested in how individual dif-
ferences in TUT experience and variability would predict EAT
performance; inclusion of meditation practitioners in our sample
was thus used as a strategy to maximize TUT-related variabil-
ity within the sample. To ensure that our present findings were
not biased by systematic group differences, all analyses were con-
ducted using group status as a nuisance covariate. Specific group
contrasts are not examined here; although they will be reported
in a follow-up investigation of the impact of mindfulness training
on EAT performance and visual sensitivity. Groups were matched
for age (mean age meditation = 35.1 years, mean age control =
34.6 years), gender (meditation = 14 males, control = 15 males),
and education (controls mean education = 16.5 years; medita-
tion mean education = 18.6 years). In our meditation study we
aimed to specifically sample “adept” practitioners; inclusion cri-
teria specified that participants must practice at least 20min per
day at a minimum of 3 times per week over the two years prior
to the study, and have attended at least 1 meditation retreat in the
previous year (mean hours practiced = 1303.6).
All fMRI scans were acquired over a one-week period following
enrollment in the study. Participation in the fMRI scan was incen-
tivized with a 200DKK (approximately $35 USD) reimbursement,
and to control motivation all participants were instructed that
the top 1/3rd of scores on the scanning task would receive an
additional 200DKK (Jensen et al., 2012).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Before scanning, participants were informed that the purpose of
the study was to investigate individual differences in their atten-
tional ability. Participants visited the lab twice, once to provide
informed consent and complete a psychophysical vision sensitiv-
ity test (data not reported here) and again to complete the fMRI
scan. Specifically the psychophysics test was the “theory of visual
attention task” (TAVT). This measure was included to replicate a
previous result that meditation experience improves TAVT per-
formance irrespective of motivation levels (Jensen et al., 2012)
and is thus not analyzed here. Participants completed 6 runs
of the EAT within the scanner, ∼45min in total. Immediately
following the scan, participants completed a debriefing survey,
rating (0–100) their experienced difficulty, interest in the task,
task effort expended, and self-estimated stop accuracy and error
awareness. These measures were included as part of the medita-
tion study to investigate the role of perceived effort, interest, and
retrospective metacognition in detected group differences. They
are presented here as overall summary measures indicating gen-
eral participant engagement with the task. See Table 1, below for
descriptive statistics of these measures.
BEHAVIORAL MEASURES
Error awareness fMRI task
To assess individual differences in response-inhibition and error
monitoring, we adapted the delayed-response EAT from Hester
et al. (2005, 2009, 2012) and Shalgi et al. (2007) (see Figure 1
for a task schematic). The EAT requires participants to respond
to a serial presentation of color-words in incongruent font colors
(i.e., the word “blue” colored red). Participants were instructed
to respond to Go trials by pressing the “1” button on a 2-button
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Table 1 | Correlations among study variables.
TUTMean TUTVariance StickMean StickVariance SA EA
TUTMean – 0.269 0.784** 0.241 −0.561** −0.128
TUTVariance – 0.163 0.654** 0.098 0.417**
StickMean – 0.401* −0.436** −0.127
StickVariance – −0.069 0.299
SA – 0.332*
EA –
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Correlation table for primary independent and dependent variables. Abbreviations: TUTMean, mean task unrelated thought (reversed);
TUTVariance, within-subject standard deviation of TUT; StickMean, mean stickiness rating; StickVariance, within-subject standard deviation of stickiness; SA, stop
accuracy; EA, error awareness.
FIGURE 1 | The EAT task with interleaved thought probes. Adapted
with permission from Hester et al. (2012). Participants respond by
pressing the left button (L) during Go trials and withhold from
responding (−) to repeated or font-color matching words. Following
commission errors, participants are trained to forgo the normal Go
response to instead press the right button “R” indicating error
awareness for that trial. Pseudo-randomly intermixed “thought probes”
prompted participants to rate the intensity of TUTs and their
“stickiness” in the pre-probe interval. See Methods for detailed
overview of task timing and instructions.
box with the right index finger. No-go trials in which participants
were instructed to withhold their response (“stop”) occurred on
approximately 11% of the total trials, according to two stop rules,
“repeat” and “color-match” (Hester et al., 2009, 2012). In the
latter, participants were required to stop whenever a word was
presented in matching font-color, and in the former whenever
a word was repeated on two consecutive trials. Each trial con-
sisted of a stimulus (600ms) followed by an interstimulus interval
(900ms).
Participants completed 6 runs of the EAT within the scanner,
each consisting of 200 Go and 25 pseudo-randomly intermixed
Stop trials, for a total of 1350 trials. In order to maximize
unaware errors andmind-wandering, participants were trained to
respond during the interstimulus interval, emphasizing accuracy
and timing consistency over absolute response speed, increasing
the repetitive nature of the Go task as in Shalgi et al. (2007).
Response timing has been used previously on the EAT task and
typically reduces the intersubject variability of responses (Hester
et al., 2005). In the case of a commission error, on the trial imme-
diately following that error participants were instructed to forgo
their normal Go response and to instead “fix” their error using a
second button (rightmiddle index finger), indicating error aware-
ness. Participants were randomly asked throughout the task to
answer probes regarding their experience during the task using
the 1 (right index) and 2 (right middle index) button (see below).
Each probe lasted up to 6 s in total followed by a fixation cross
(duration = 6 s – probe duration).
Because the occurrence of TUTs is negatively related to
task difficulty (Christoff et al., 2009), task-overlearning was
promoted prior to scanning by training all participants on
2–4 practice runs of the EAT until a minimum of 40% stop
and 40% error awareness rate was reached. To control par-
ticipant’s motivation to perform the task, participants were
instructed that they would gain an additional 200 DKK (about
35 USD) if they were within the top 1/3rd of EAT perfor-
mance. Participants were further reminded that “fixing” com-
mission errors via the report button would cause those errors
to not count against their total score, to ensure that participants
did not selectively focus on stopping to the exclusion of error
reports.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 743 | 4
Allen et al. Monitoring and the wandering mind
Individual stop accuracy and error awareness scores were
determined for each participant. Stop accuracy was calculated as
the ratio of correctly withheld stop trials over the total number
of stop trials (Correct stops/total stops), and error awareness as
the ratio of number of reported error trials over total number of
error trials (aware errors/unaware errors). Go accuracy was cal-
culated as the ratio of the total number of correct responses (e.g.,
reaction time > 0 in a Go trial) over the total number of Go tri-
als, excluding trials following errors (which are confounded by
the error reporting response). Mean TUT and stickiness scores,
as well as within-subject standard deviations were calculated for
each participant as measures of the average content and variance
of each subjective dimension.
Prior to analysis participants with extremely low stop accuracy
(indicating a failure to correctly perform the task) were iden-
tified; one participant with <50% accuracy was excluded from
all subsequent EAT-related analyses. As overall performance was
generally high, three participants had too few errors (<5) to be
included in error related behavioral analyses and were excluded
(O’Connell et al., 2009; Hester et al., 2012). Finally, for our error
related fMRI analysis 2 additional participants with 0 aware errors
were excluded. A total of 6 participants were thus excluded from
the error related fMRI analysis.
Subjective mind-wandering reports
Subjective awareness of TUTs was assessed in a similar fashion
to Christoff et al. (2009), using interleaved “thought probes” dis-
tributed pseudo-randomly throughout the EAT task. Each probe
consisted of two questions, one evaluating the subjective inten-
sity of TUTs, “Where was your attention focused just before the
probe?” and the second evaluating the “sticky” or ruminative
quality of mind-wandering, “How sticky were your TUTs just
before the probe?.” Participants responded using a 7-point scale
ranging from “completely offtask” to “completely ontask” for the
first and “completely sticky” to “not at all sticky” for the second.
As we were interested in investigating particular phenomenolog-
ical properties of mind-wandering, we combined two previous
approaches to sampling task irrelevant thoughts. First, to min-
imize differences in scale properties we utilized a TUT scale in
which participants rated their pre-probe thoughts as “ontask”
or “offtask” as in Christoff et al. (2009). However, to specifi-
cally operationalize the subjective intensity of mind-wandering,
we adapted phenomenological descriptions of TUTs from Mason
et al. (2007). Participants were thus instructed that being “ontask”
specifically meant that they had a “low frequency of task irrel-
evant thoughts,” with task irrelevant thoughts being defined as
“any that do not facilitate performance and are not immediate
reactions to perceptual information gleaned over the course of a
trial.” All participants indicated understanding that ratings on the
ontask/offtask scale corresponded to this definition. Examples of
task relevant thoughts were given, such as those concerning the
color of a word on the previous trial.
By fixing this subjective dimension, we aimed to stress the
possibility of dissociation between high intensity TUTs with
little impact on participants’ metacognitive capacity and high-
intensity TUTs that fully absorbed the participants’ attention
(e.g., “sticky” TUTs). Participants were therefor instructed to
rate the “stickiness” of their task-irrelevant thoughts, with sticky
thoughts defined as those that “distract (the participant) for a
greater period of time, and are more attention catching than other
task-irrelevant thoughts; this experience is sometimes described
as being ‘lost in thought’.” Stickiness was thus included to explore
whether ruminative and absorptive TUT compared to non-
ruminative and non-absorptive TUT differentially impact sus-
tained attention and error awareness (Koster et al., 2011; Van Vugt
et al., 2012). Examples were given to emphasize the decoupled
nature of sticky and unsticky task-irrelevant thoughts; partici-
pants were instructed that for example certain thoughts might
arise (“What am I having for dinner tonight?”) but be rela-
tively non-distracting from the task, whereas others (“Did I leave
my oven on?”) might recur frequently throughout the task and
demand more attention. Participants were provided with further
examples until they indicated a good understanding of the dis-
tinction and completed practice probes during the EAT training
session. During scanning participants completed 26 probes in
total, 4–5 per 6 EAT runs, with one probe event (“focus” and
“sticky”) occurring pseudo-randomly every 40–60 trials through-
out the EAT. Each probe appeared for a maximum of 6 s followed
by a fixation cross lasting up to 6 s depending on probe reaction
time (e.g., 6 - Probe Duration). Due to the dependent nature of
sticky thoughts on having some TUTs, we did not counter-balance
the order of focus and sticky. Stickiness was thus operationalized
as a second-order judgment on the quality of those TUTs reported
in the first probe.
Auxillary recordings
As the BOLD signal reflects complicated neurovascular coupling,
a considerable portion of BOLD variability can be explained
by non-neural origins such as respiratory and cardiovascular
fluctuation (Glover et al., 2000; Lund et al., 2006). Previous inves-
tigations have shown that regions implicated in both error mon-
itoring (e.g., insula and cingulate) and mind-wandering (mPFC)
are among the most susceptible to such artifacts, with as much
as 8% of event-related variance being explained by these sources
(Chang and Glover, 2009; Chang et al., 2009). To exclude such
confounds and improve overall signal-to-noise ratio, we recorded
both respiration and pulse in parallel with EPI image acquisition,
in order to apply a nuisance variable regression approach to mod-
eling serial correlations in the BOLD time series (Lund et al.,
2006). During the functional MRI acquisition the cardiac and
respiratory cycles were recorded with an infrared pulse oxime-
ter on the patient’s index-finger and a pneumatic thoracic belt,
respectively.
All pulse and respiration time series were visually examined
for acquisition artifacts (e.g., clipping, drop-out). Due to tech-
nical failure of the respiration belt, respiration time series were
severely confounded and discarded from further analysis. While
inclusion of both respiratory and pulse regressors has been shown
to provide an optimal estimation of serial correlation, inclu-
sion of pulse and motion regressors without respiration has been
shown to also outperform standard autoregressive (“AR1”) noise-
whitening techniques, particularly at faster repetition times (e.g.,
TR <4 s) (Lund et al., 2006). Descriptive statistics (mean heart-
beats per min) were calculated for each subject. One participant’s
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physiological data were lost due to technical failure and was hence
excluded from all fMRI analyses.
fMRI acquisition protocols and preprocessing
Echo-planar images (EPI) were acquired at the Aarhus University
Hospital, using a T2∗-weighted, gradient echo sequence on a 3
Tesla (Siemens Trio) scanner, equipped with a 32-channel head
coil. EPI images were acquired in an interleaved slice acquisition
order (TR = 2000ms, TE = 30ms, flip angle = 90◦, 47 slices of
3mm thickness, in-plane resolution of 3 × 3 × 3, FOV = 192 ×
192mm). Soft cushions were used to minimize head movement.
All fMRI preprocessing and data analyses were performed
in SPM8 (version 4667) (Friston et al., 2006). Default settings
were used throughout, unless otherwise specified. The functional
images of each participant were realigned and resliced (Friston
et al., 1995), spatially normalized to MNI space using the SPM
EPI template and trilinear interpolation (Ashburner and Friston,
1999), and smoothed using a 8mm full-width half-maximum
(FWHM) smoothing kernel (Worsley and Friston, 1995; Friston
et al., 2000). Serial correlations were modeled using a nuisance
variable regression approach (Lund et al., 2006). In addition to
the SPM8 standard discrete cosine set high pass filter (128 s cut
off), this approach includes 10 regressors based on cardiac and/or
respiratory oscillations (Glover et al., 2000) and 6 motion param-
eters obtained from the realignment algorithm (Friston et al.,
1996).
ANALYSIS
Error awareness task—reaction times and accuracy
To compare our results with previous experiments using the EAT,
we analyzed accuracy and reaction time values across conditions.
Go reaction times for each participant were calculated as the
mean of all correct Go trials, excluding responses 2 SD below
the participants mean Go RT. For comparison to previous exper-
iments with the EAT, stop accuracy, error awareness, and mean
reaction times were calculated for each subcategory of stop, i.e.,
color and repeat stop accuracy, color and repeat aware/unaware
errors, and RT to color and repeat stop errors. Mean reaction
times where inspected for values ±2 SD from the mean, result-
ing in the removal of 3 participants RT data. Reaction times
were entered into One-Way repeated measures ANOVAs, within
subject factor Response type (Go, Aware, Unaware) to assess dif-
ferences in response speed across condition. Finally, we analyzed
Stop Accuracy and Error awareness for each error subcategory
(Repeat, Color) in separate one-way repeated measures ANOVAs.
Mind-wandering and behavior
Our first aim was to replicate previously reported relationships
between performance and TUTs. To establish whether or not
TUT ratings were utilized as a continuous or discrete mea-
sure, we created response histograms across all collected ratings,
which showed a clear continuous distribution indicating that
participants did not treat the scales as discrete binary measures
(Figure 2). As TUT variance and stickiness had not been previ-
ously investigated, we then conducted a cross-correlation analysis
to determine measurement colinearity. All scores were converted
into Z-scores at the group level. Correlations between TUTMean.,
TUTVariance, StickinessMean, StickinessVariance, error awareness
and stop accuracy were calculated (see Table 1). TUTMean and
StickinessMean were highly correlated (r = 0.78, p < 0.001).
TUTMean also predicted stop accuracy (r = −0.56, p < 0.001).
TUTVariance was correlated with StickinessVariance, (r = 0.65, p <
FIGURE 2 | Regression plots of TUTmean TUTVariance vs. error
awareness (EA) and stop accuracy (SA). On the left, a histogram of all
TUT responses recorded in the session showing continuous distribution of
responses from 1 to 7 (scale response value on x-axis). Plotted relationships
show a clear relationship between individual differences in TUTMean and
stop accuracy, such that higher levels of TUT predict worse inhibition
performance (bottom right). In contrast high levels of TUTVariance predict
increased error monitoring (top left). Scatterplots depict relationships
between TUTMean, within-subject standard deviation of TUT (TUTVariance), or
composite mean measures (TUTMean + StickinessMean) and composite
within-subject variance measures (TUTVariance + StickinessVariance). Prior to
analysis TUT scores were reversed so that higher numbers reflect
increased TUT, and all variables were transformed into Z -scores.
Dependent variables are residualized for group status and opposing
variables (e.g., SA for EA, TUTMean for TUTVariance, TUT composite for TUT
variance composite, respectively). Data points represent individual
participant scores. p-values show significance for each predictor variable
from multiple regression model (see Results for more details).
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0.001) and EA (r = 0.42, p < 0.01). StickinessMean correlated
with StickinessVariance (r = 0.40, p < 0.03) and with stop accu-
racy (r = 0.44, p < 0.01). Finally, SA and EA showed moderate
correlation (r = 0.33, p < 0.05).
fMRI analysis—single subject level
Following preprocessing, functional BOLD data were analyzed
using an event-related hierarchical general linear modeling
approach (Friston et al., 1994). Sessions were first concatenated
and then entered into a first level design matrix modeling fixed
linear effects over the entire time series. Each fMRI time series
was modeled using 3 event-related regressors (duration = 0 s) for
each condition of interest, in order: Correct Stop Trials, Unaware
Errors, Aware Errors, as well as a separate TUT probe regres-
sor (30 s duration epoch) shifted 37.50 s (25 trials) before each
thought probe occurred, and a parametric modulation of the
probe regressor encoding the rating for that probe. Due to the
high correlation between TUT and stickiness ratings, we esti-
mated two separate models, one with the mean TUT rating only
and one with the stickiness only. Stop trials were modeled as the
onset of each correct stop. Aware and unaware error trials were
modeled as the onset of the trial in which the error occurred. In
the EAT, Go trials are commonly left unmodeled as implicit base-
line (Hester et al., 2005, 2012; O’Connell et al., 2009). The onset
of each probe block regressor was jittered ± ∼1 s. Probe regres-
sors thus modeled task-related activity in the pre-probe interval
and the linear modulatory effect of self-reported TUT intensity
during that period. In addition to conditions of interest, each ses-
sionmodel included 10 pulse and 6motion-realignment nuisance
regressors, to model confounding effects of these parameters.
Session offsets modeled between-session variance. Fixed-effects
of interest were identified using unidirectional t-contrasts for cor-
rect stop trials [(1 0 0 0 . . . )], aware > unaware errors [(0 −1 1
0. . . )], and linear correlation with the TUT report parameter [(0 0
0 0 1)]. As is common in error awareness paradigms, participants
generally report substantially fewer errors than they commit (see
Table 2 for summary of average total errors in each condition),
leading to concerns that comparison of aware and unaware events
may be unduly biased. Previous use of the EAT (Hester et al.,
2005) has demonstrated that the aware vs. unaware analysis is not
biased toward activity from aware errors.
fMRI analysis—group level
Our random-effects (RFX) analysis focused on three contrasts:
correct stops (vs. baseline), aware vs. unaware errors, and the neg-
ative correlation of TUT reports and task-related BOLD activity.
All RFX analyses were conducted by passing each participant’s
corresponding contrast image (stops, aware> unaware, TUT rat-
ings) to a one-sample t-test. These contrasts were corrected for
multiple comparisons using Gaussian random-field-theory, peak
level family-wise error threshold (FWE) p < 0.05 (Worsley et al.,
1996). For our analysis of BOLD correlation with task-unrelated
thoughts, a mask of the DMNwas created by conducting an auto-
mated meta-analysis on the Neurosynth database for “mPFC”
(http://neurosynth.org) (Yarkoni et al., 2011). As the TUT param-
eter encoded the intensity of TUTs (1–7) prior to each probe, low
values encoded higher levels of TUT. Thus, at the group contrast
Table 2 | EAT behavioral and post-scan summary measures.
Category M SD
ACCURACY AND ERRORS
Go accuracy (% correct) 80.3 0.1
No-go accuracy (% correct) 77.0 14.3
Repeat No-go accuracy 81.0 18.0
Color No-go accuracy 72.8 21.0
Error awareness (% of aware errors) 35.5 20.0
Repeat error awareness 26.9 20.6
Color error awareness* 43.7 24.4
Aware errors (total) 12.0 7.8
Unaware errors (total) 25.3 18.6
REACTION TIMES (ms)
Go 1103.32 11.49
Aware error 1086.38 14.68
Unaware error** 1060.31 17.31
SUBJECTIVE AND PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES
Task unrelated thought (1–7) 3.0 1.1
Stickiness (1–7) 2.5 1.0
Heartbeats per min 65.1 8.7
POST-SCAN DEBRIEF (1–100)
Estimated EA 49.1 26.9
Estimate SA 76.8 14.0
Difficulty 56.0 23.3
Effort 92.5 9.1
Interest 63.2 28.3
*Significant difference between repeat and color error awareness p < 0.01.
**Significant difference between GoRT and unaware error RT, p < 0.01. Table
shows mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) for accuracy of each EAT stop and
error sub-category, as well as mean reaction times for Go, Aware, and Unaware
Error trials. Mean self-reported task unrelated thoughts, reversed so higher num-
bers correspond with greater TUT, and post-scan responses to visual analog
scale for self-estimated task performance, task difficulty, effort spent, and overall
interest. See Methods for detailed task description.
level, we tested for areas where greater reports of TUT predicted
higher BOLD activity (negative correlation with TUT ratings and
BOLD). To restrict the mask to primary clusters in mPFC, pCC,
and inferior parietal lobes the downloaded NIFTII image was
binarized at a Z-score > 4 threshold. The resulting mask (see
Figure 5) was visually inspected to confirm that it provided good
coverage of key DMN nodes, particularly in mPFC and pCC, and
was subsequently applied in a region of interest analysis using the
Wake Forest University (WFU) Pickatlas toolbox v3.0 (Maldjian
et al., 2003, 2004), cluster-level corrected for multiple corrections,
voxel selection threshold p = 0.01, pFWE<0.05 (Hayasaka et al.,
2004). To ensure BOLD results were not biased by group status,
all random effects contrasts included group status as a covariate
of no-interest.
RESULTS
EAT—BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
Participants correctly withheld on the majority of stop tri-
als (Mean SA = 77.0%, SD = 14.3%) and on average reported
approximately 36% of total stop errors (Mean EA = 35.5%, SD =
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0.20%). Stop accuracy was similar to previously reported results
using the delayed-response EAT (M = 83.88, SD = 13.98), but
with lower error awareness (M = 59.09, SD = 18.55), suggesting
that task-overlearning successfully promoted automatic respond-
ing (Shalgi et al., 2007). Mauchly’s test indicated that EAT
reaction times violated the assumption of sphericity, χ2(5) =
8.54, p = 0.014, therefore the degrees of freedom were cor-
rected using a Huynh-Feldt estimate of sphericity (ε = 0.85).
There was a significant effect of response condition on reaction
time (RT) F(1.69, 57.77) = 5.17, p = 0.012; post-hoc comparisons
demonstrated that this effect was driven by a significant dif-
ference between Go RT (M = 1103.32ms, SD = 11.49ms) and
Unaware Error RTs (M = 1060.31ms, SD = 17.31ms), mean
difference = −43.0ms, p = 0.008. This decrease in RT dur-
ing unaware errors is consistent with prior studies showing a
link between task automaticity and mind-wandering (Smallwood
et al., 2007a, 2008b, 2011). Aware error RTs (M = 1086.38ms,
SD = 14.68) did not differ significantly from unaware or Go RTs.
See Table 1 for a complete summary of EAT behavioral results.
Participants showed a trend toward committing more errors dur-
ing color than repeat trials F(1, 40) = 3.97, p = 0.053, and they
also reported being aware of more errors during color than during
repeat trials F(1, 38) = 14.32, p = 0.001.
MINDWANDERING MEAN AND VARIANCE vs. EAT BEHAVIOR
Regression analysis with TUTVariance, TUTMean, StickinessVariance,
and StickinessMean, group status, and error awareness as pre-
dictors explained 53.5% of stop accuracy variance [F(6, 38) =
6.15, p < 0.001]; mean TUT was a highly significant predic-
tor, β = −0.78, p = 0.001. Additionally group status significantly
predicted SA, β = 0.33, p = 0.014. Follow-up t-tests revealed
that the meditation group exhibited approximately 10% more
stop accuracy (p = 0.022). No other predictors were signifi-
cant. The same model with error awareness as the dependent
variable explained 27.9% of the variance in error awareness at
an above-threshold level [F(6, 38) = 2.07, p = 0.085]; no indi-
vidual predictors reached significance. Given the high level of
correlation between TUT and stickiness for both variance (r =
0.65, p < 0.001) and mean (r = 0.78, p < 0.001), we constructed
composite indices of mind-wandering variance (TUTVariance +
StickinessVariance) and mean (TUTMean + StickinessMean) and
repeated the regression analysis with the composites scores as pre-
dictors (again with the opposite DV and group status as control
variables).
The resulting regression models explained 44.2% of stop accu-
racy variance [F(4, 38) = 6.74, p < 0.001] and 27.4% of error
awareness variance [F(4, 38) = 3.21, p = 0.025], respectively.
Within the model predicting stop accuracy, the mean mind-
wandering composite was a significant predictor, β = −3.49, p =
0.001, as well as group status, β = 0.31, p = 0.026. Conversely,
within the model predicting error awareness, only the mind-
wandering variance composite significantly predicted EA, β =
0.44, p = 0.010. The observed difference between the inclusive
and composite models suggests that TUTMean-related variance
(as opposed to StickinessMean) was the primary predictor for SA.
Importantly, EA exhibited strong zero-order correlations with
TUTVariance and showed no correlation with StickinessVariance.
Thus, including stickiness in the overall model only reduced
model sensitivity, as shown by the significant effect of the variance
composite on EA, suggesting that only the unique TUT-related
variance predicts EA (e.g., the only observed impact of mod-
eling StickinessVariance can be explained by the reduced degrees
of freedom for that model). We thus report the composite here
for completeness, noting that the high multi-colinearity of the
Stickiness and TUT variance likely reduces our ability to distin-
guish them in a regression model (Farrar and Glauber, 1967).
These results suggest that individual differences in the average and
variability of mind-wandering are specific predictors of EA and
SA ability, with increasing absorption in internal thought pre-
dicting worse stop performance, and higher levels of variability
predicting greater error awareness. See Figure 2 for plots of these
relationships.
fMRI—OVERALL RESPONSES TO STOP AND AWARE vs. UNAWARE
ERRORS
Across participants, correct stops elicited significant BOLD acti-
vations throughout the canonical motor inhibition network,
including bilateral anterior insula, superior parietal lobes, supple-
mentary motor areas, and bilateral putamen (Hester et al., 2005;
Wager et al., 2005; Verbruggen and Logan, 2008). Robust deacti-
vations were observed in the DMN (dorsal mPFC and precuneus)
as well as primary and secondary visual cortices (see Tables 3, 4,
Figures 3, 4, for a complete summary of Stop-related responses).
The Aware> Unaware contrast revealed significant activations in
the salience and frontal-parietal attention networks (Seeley et al.,
2007), including right anterior insula, thalamus, caudate nucleus,
mid-cingulate cortex, middle frontal gyrus, and bilateral dorso-
lateral/rostral prefrontal cortex. Interestingly, we also observed
significant activation of bilateral inferior parietal cortex, a region
of the DMN, during aware errors. See Table 5 and Figure 5 for a
complete summary of Aware> Unaware responses.
fMRI—BOLD CORRELATION WITH TUT REPORTS
We found significant correlations between probe-related BOLD
signal and TUT intensity reports in clusters located in the mPFC
(pFWE = 0.038, k = 685), pCC (p = 0.004, k = 11), and supe-
rior parietal lobe (p = 0.004, k = 9) (See Figure 4, Table 6).
Only the mPFC cluster survived correction for multiple com-
parisons. No significant clusters correlating positively with TUT
were found. For comparison of spatial overlap, results from the
TUT and Stop analyses were overlaid on a single image. This
comparison suggested that while correct stops primarily elicited
de-activations in a dorsal region of mPFC, TUT intensity pre-
dicted activity in a more rostral region (Figure 4). We found no
significant correlations between probe-related BOLD signal and
TUT stickiness.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with previous fMRI work (Mason et al., 2007;
Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011), we found that
during the EAT, intervals in which participants reported more
frequent TUT predicted significant BOLD signal increases in the
mPFC. We also found that correct stop trials were character-
ized by both deactivations in the dorsal mPFC and pCC, and
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Table 3 | Brain regions displaying significant BOLD activations for
correct stop trials compared to baseline.
Brain regions Voxels k pFWE T MNI coordinates
x y z
L Medial frontal gyrus 2560 <0.001 10.7 −6 −8 62
L Precentral <0.001 10.68 −50 −10 54
R Supplementary <0.001 7.44 10 −4 62
Motor
R Insula 1057 <0.001 9.34 30 20 −6
R Anterior insula <0.001 8.06 34 14 8
CSF near Putamen <0.001 7.47 4 6 12
White matter near PCC 579 <0.001 8.46 6 −26 22
R Precentral 708 <0.001 7.6 48 −2 42
R Precentral (BA 6) <0.001 7.53 56 −2 50
R Precentral (BA 9) 0.001 6.65 44 2 28
R Supramarginal 755 <0.001 7.5 60 −44 44
R Inferior parietal <0.001 7.49 46 −40 46
R Inferior parietal <0.001 7.33 56 −42 52
L Pallidum 1022 <0.001 7.2 −22 −6 16
L Anterior insula 0.001 7.01 −30 16 6
L Putamen 0.001 6.62 −20 4 2
L Inferior parietal 324 0.001 6.83 −44 −42 44
L Inferior parietal 0.007 6.04 −58 −46 44
L Inferior parietal 0.021 5.64 −52 −48 54
R Middle temporal 47 0.001 6.68 46 −40 6
L Thalamus 98 0.003 6.35 0 −12 −4
R Thalamus 0.024 5.57 14 −12 2
L Precentral 125 0.004 6.28 −42 0 26
Left rolandic 0.015 5.77 −48 0 18
operculum
R Middle cingulate 28 0.007 6.02 10 16 38
L Inferior frontal 23 0.011 5.89 −48 32 32
R Fusiform 7 0.017 5.71 38 −48 −14
L Inferior parietal 12 0.02 5.65 −42 −46 30
R Middle temporal 9 0.023 5.6 64 −40 12
L Thalamus 6 0.025 5.56 −4 −2 −2
Cluster size k = number of contiguous voxels for that cluster. Contiguous sub-
clusters shown beneath parent cluster. P-values peak-corrected for multiple
comparisons, pFWE < 0.05.
increased activity in the motor inhibition and salience networks,
suggesting an important interaction between these networks dur-
ing cognitive control (Allen and Williams, 2011). Interestingly
the portion of the mPFC deactivated by inhibition was in a non-
overlapping portion ofmidline cortex, more dorsal to those voxels
showing correlated responses to TUT intensity. While much of
the research on task performance and the DMN has focused on
their mutual antagonism, this finding may support some degree
of functional segregation between self-generated thoughts and
executive-related prefrontal inhibition. Additionally we found
that during error awareness the inferior parietal cortex, a region
of the DMN, was recruited along with common salience related
regions such as insula and cingulate cortex. Coupled with our
finding that mind-wandering variability predicts error moni-
toring performance, these results suggest that the relationship
Table 4 | Brain regions with significant BOLD activations to
baseline > correct stops.
Brain region Voxels k pFWE T MNI coordinates
x y z
L Calcarine (BA 17) 5064 <0.001 10.73 −10 −96 16
L Calcarine (BA 17) <0.001 10.51 −2 −92 10
R Calcarine (BA 17) <0.001 10.03 6 −92 8
L Superior medial 932 <0.001 7.96 0 52 46
R Superior medial <0.001 7.77 8 68 20
L Superior medial <0.001 7.48 −2 66 18
R Supplementary
motor (BA 6)
60 0.001 6.85 4 18 70
L Inferior frontal 34 0.01 5.9 −54 28 −2
L Middle temporal 6 0.021 5.64 −40 −58 20
Cluster size k = number of contiguous voxels for that cluster. Contiguous sub-
clusters shown beneath parent cluster. P-values peak-corrected for multiple
comparisons, pFWE < 0.05.
FIGURE 3 | Central executive and salience network BOLD responses to
correct stop trials vs. baseline. Significant activations throughout the
motor control and salience networks, including premotor/supplementary
motor area (top left and right), anterior insula (bottom left), putamen,
(bottom left) and middle frontal gyrus (top right) BOLD activations to
correct stop trials, shown in yellow. Voxel-wise statistical parametric maps
(pFWE < 0.05, k threshold > 5 contiguous voxels) superimposed on SPM
canonical anatomical image, average of 305 T1-weighted images. Top left
shown at MNI Z = 62, top right at X = 47, bottom left at Z = −3, bottom
right at Y = −8. See Table 3 for a complete list of foci.
between task performance and self-generated thought may be
more nuanced than mere antagonism.
Our results also inform our understanding of the link between
TUT and task performance. We replicated the finding that over-
all levels of TUT can interfere with demanding tasks, potentially
reflecting the role of TUT in facilitating perceptual decoupling
(Smallwood, 2013). Consistent with prior studies we also found
TUT reports were associated with greater mPFC activity (Mason
et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009). Higher levels of variability
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FIGURE 4 | DMN deactivations during stop trials (blue, top) and
correlation with TUT reports (red, top), and mask used for ROI analysis
(red, bottom). Note that while both task-unrelated thoughts and response
inhibition engage the DMN, they recruit spatially unique regions of the
mPFC. To facilitate comparison of spatial topography for EAT and
TUT-related DMN activity, both activation maps are overlaid on a single MNI
structural brain. In blue, significant deactivations during EAT stop trials
(pFWE peak < 0.05, k threshold = 5 contiguous voxels). In red, increased
self-reported TUT predicts greater mPFC BOLD activation, pFWE cluster <
0.05, region-of-interest analysis with DMN mask volume (bottom image
shown in red), k threshold = 685 contiguous voxels. DMN mask generated
using automated meta-analysis for term “mPFC” on neurosynth.org,
z-score threshold > 4 (see Methods for further details). Statistical
parametric maps superimposed on SPM canonical anatomical image,
average of 305 T1-weighted images. Top image shown at MNI X = −5,
bottom at X = 0.
in TUT were associated with a trend toward better stop per-
formance, but more importantly, individuals who showed high
variability in TUT more accurately detected mistakes made in
the response inhibition task. Altogether, this pattern suggests that
although mind-wandering has negative consequences for task
performance, individuals who balance states of self-generated and
task related experiences are relatively more effective at monitoring
their performance. Importantly, a simple demand characteris-
tic explanation would not predict these results as participants
were motivated by financial rewards to perform the task as
well as possible. As self-generated thought has both costs and
Table 5 | Brain regions with significant BOLD responses during
aware > unaware errors.
Brain region Voxels k pFWE T MNI coordinates
x y z
L Pallidum 497 <0.001 7.68 −14 −4 2
L Caudate 0.004 6.53 −12 10 −4
L Putamen 0.009 6.2 −26 10 6
L Superior frontal 775 <0.001 7.52 −24 −6 64
L Superior 0.001 7.34 −16 −4 66
frontal (BA 6)
L Superior 0.001 7.18 −28 −8 50
frontal (WM)
R Inferior 126 0.001 7.35 50 4 30
frontal (BA 44)
R Supplementary 1523 0.001 7.31 12 2 70
motor (BA6)
R Middle
Cingulate
0.001 7.25 6 4 38
R Superior
frontal
0.001 7.03 16 0 62
R Caudate 615 0.001 7.3 10 4 −2
R Caudate (WM) 0.001 7.05 16 0 14
R Putamen 0.001 6.97 24 16 0
L Inferior 1267 0.001 7.28 −40 −34 48
parietal (BA 2)
L Supramarginal 0.001 7.1 −48 −44 38
L Inferior parietal 0.001 7.1 −52 −34 46
R Precentral 100 0.001 7.08 34 −6 44
R Thalamus 67 0.001 7.06 4 −20 −4
R Supramarginal 324 0.002 6.86 54 −22 32
R Inferior parietal 0.005 6.45 54 −28 42
R Inferior parietal 0.005 6.44 52 −42 38
L Thalamus 20 0.002 6.76 −18 −14 16
R Middle temporal 49 0.004 6.54 44 −72 28
R Inferior temporal 57 0.008 6.25 56 −50 −6
L Middle frontal 136 0.008 6.24 −32 46 28
L Middle frontal 0.037 5.65 −38 34 32
R Middle temporal 13 0.012 6.09 48 −54 20
R Parahippocampal 6 0.014 6.04 18 0 −16
L Superior
temporal
20 0.014 6.03 −54 −48 22
R Middle frontal 13 0.017 5.95 30 34 34
R Posterior 7 0.018 5.94 8 −32 36
Cingulate (in WM)
R Superior frontal 47 0.018 5.94 26 42 26
R Inferior frontal 7 0.02 5.9 52 6 14
(BA 44)
R Middle temporal 9 0.026 5.79 54 −36 −8
L Precentral 12 0.026 5.79 −50 8 38
(BA 44)
Cluster size k = number of contiguous voxels for that cluster. Contiguous sub-
clusters shown beneath parent cluster. P-values peak-corrected for multiple
comparisons, pFWE < 0.05.
benefits (McVay et al., 2008; Smallwood et al., 2008a; Baird
et al., 2011; Mrazek et al., 2012; Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna,
2013; Smallwood et al., 2013a), it is possible that the association
between metacognition and greater variability in mental states
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FIGURE 5 | Salience and default mode network BOLD responses to
Aware > Unaware Errors. During conscious error monitoring we observed
significant activations throughout the salience and control networks,
including mid-cingulate (top right), middle frontal, dorsolateral prefrontal,
bilateral caudate (bottom right), right insula (bottom right), superior, and
inferior parietal cortex (bottom left) activations. Note that in addition to
common salience and error related regions, we observed bilateral inferior
parietal responses to this contrast, i.e., co-activation of salience and DMN.
Statistical parametric map (pFWE < 0.05, k threshold > 5 contiguous
voxels) superimposed on SPM canonical anatomical image, average of 305
T1-weighted images. Top left “glass brain” displays activation extent in
three dimensional space. Top right shown at MNI X coordinate = 1, bottom
left at X = −43. Bottom right shown at Z = 1. See Table 5 for a complete
list of foci.
Table 6 | Regions showing correlations between task-related BOLD
and TUT rating.
Brain region Voxels k pFWEc pUnc MNI coordinates
x y z
L Superior medial 645 0.047 0.002 −12 60 8
R Superior medial 0.002 8 64 8
L Anterior cingulate 0.002 −8 44 6
*L Superior medial 89 0.776 0.004 −4 42 26
*L Inferior parietal 9 0.981 0.004 −46 −72 28
*L Posterior cingulate 9 0.981 0.006 −4 −56 22
Cluster size k = number of contiguous voxels for that cluster. Contiguous sub-
clusters shown beneath parent cluster. P-values cluster corrected for multiple
comparisons within default mode network mask, inclusion threshold P > 0.01 k
threshold pFWEc < 0.05. Uncorrected p-values (*) at inclusion threshold level
shown for completeness. DMN mask generated using automated meta-analysis
for “mPFC” on neurosynth.org, see Methods for details.
reflects an increased ability to balance self-generated thought and
external perceptual processes, optimizing task performance over
both immediate and more temporally extended events.
In general, behavioral variability reflects the sensitivity
of cognition to fluctuating task demands, and can produce
positive or negative outcomes depending on behavioral context
(Lutz et al., 2002). Conscious error awareness depends upon
integrating interoceptive error cues with visual-motor control
signals (Sridharan et al., 2008; Ullsperger et al., 2010; Klein et al.,
2013). Our finding that individual differences in TUT variability
relate to error monitoring performance may thus depend upon
the individual capacity to flexibly switch between and integrate
across different information sources. Alternatively, our data may
simply indicate that both online performance monitoring and
flexibility in the contents of conscious thought both depend on a
single domain general metacognitive process. However, this later
interpretation is inconsistent with prior studies indicating that
the correlation between metacognitive accuracy for memory and
perception is unreliable and that success in both domains both
depend on distinct resting neural networks (Baird et al., 2013).
Regardless of the specific relationship, our data extends the
role of metacognition in enhancing the flexibility of conscious
thought (Flavell, 1979; Shimamura, 2000). One speculative impli-
cation of this result is that by utilizing metacognition to reduce
perseveration on either internal or external information, an indi-
vidual may be able to exploit the benefits of self-generated
thought while minimizing the costs as far as possible. One pos-
sible mechanism supporting such a benefit may be an increased
ability to regulate the context and content in which self-generated
thought occurs (Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). More
generally our data suggest that the role of metacognitive moni-
toring in facilitating TUT may explain why the mPFC, a region
implicated in metacognition (Schmitz et al., 2004; Fleming et al.,
2012; Frith and Frith, 2012), is also active during self-generated
thought. Plausibly, the mPFC could allow an individual to reflect
upon the contents of their self-generated thoughts and so bene-
fit from this memory driven mode of thought to make progress
on their ongoing behavioral goals. Future research should explore
the possibility that certain forms of self-generated thought entail
metacognitive processing in coordinating the occurrence or the
content of the experience.
Although we advance an interpretation of TUT variance as
relating to metacognition, it must be noted that there is emerg-
ing evidence for a functional dissociation of reflective metacog-
nition and online error monitoring processes (Fleming et al.,
2012). While the former is typically thought to involve top-down
conscious judgments of the reliability of a particular source of
information, error awareness has increasingly been shown to
involve distinct functional systems, particularly the salience net-
work, e.g., anterior insula and rostral cingulate. Both reflective
metacognition and error monitoring are thought to contribute
to such self-evaluations and are impaired by lesions to the PFC
and anterior cingulate cortex (Hoerold et al., 2012). However,
signal-theoretic models suggest that error awareness may con-
tribute more directly to an interoceptive sense of uncertainty or
doubt, or a graded subliminal awareness of errors (Fleming et al.,
2012; Charles et al., 2013). Thus, an interesting and unresolved
question for future research is whether meta-cognitive confidence
in TUT ratings might predict stop-accuracy, as predicted by the
meta-awareness hypothesis (Schooler, 2002; Maniscalco and Lau,
2012).
Our results also have implications for understanding the
component process view of the DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al.,
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2010; Andrews-Hanna, 2012). We found that the intensity of
self-reported TUTs predicted activations in the mPFC, and that
successful stops de-activated a more dorsal region of the mPFC.
Thus, our results suggest a dissociation between elements of the
DMN: Both the pCC and dorsal areas of the mPFC are inhibited
when individuals engage in cognitive control, whereas more
rostral regions of the mPFC are engaged during self-generated
thought. Consistent with the distinction our data suggests, a
graph theoretical analysis of the DMN implicates ventral regions
of mPFC in the midline core of the system, while dorsal regions
of the mPFC participates in what is known as the dorsal medial
pre-frontal subsystem (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). Based on
our data we speculate that more rostral-prefrontal regions of
mPFCmay be especially important in the self-generation of men-
tal contents that are unrelated to ongoing task performance, an
observation which is consistent with evidence that this brain
region is linked to self-referent information processing (Mitchell
et al., 2005; Mitchell, 2009). In contrast, dorsal regions of mPFC
were deactivated when cognitive control was employed on task
relevant information, supporting suggestions that this regionmay
play a more general role in states of decoupled processing regard-
less of whether they are based on personally relevant information
(see also Smallwood et al., 2013b).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In the present design we attempted to control participant motiva-
tion through financial reward; it is possible that our motivation
manipulation interacted with self-reports, although we specifi-
cally instructed participants to report their honest experience.
Indeed, we observed activations in reward-related areas includ-
ing the caudate nucleus and putamen in our error awareness and
stop contrasts (Schultz, 2000; Haruno and Kawato, 2006). Future
research may benefit from shorter task intervals in a behavioral
setting, to establish the role of motivational reward in reports of
mind-wandering behavior (see for example Mrazek et al., 2012).
Our results also suggest that TUT accounted for a significant
amount of variability in the EAT. Previous research has impli-
cated disrupted error awareness in ADHD and cocaine abuse
(Hester et al., 2007; O’Connell et al., 2009); our findings suggest
that such disruptions could be related to reduced variability of
mind-wandering during the EAT and/or increased overall TUT,
reflecting cognitive rigidity.
We also attempted to apply a subjective distinction between
the intensity or subjective frequency of TUTs and their “stick-
iness,” to generate self-reports capturing unique aspects of
phenomenological experience, effectively “front-loading” phe-
nomenological intuition into our experimental design (Gallagher,
2003). Although we attempted to create a distinction between
the subjective frequency of TUTs and their attention-capturing
nature, our data suggest a large degree of colinearity in these
measures. This null-finding raises the possibility that a more
prolonged familiarization of participants with subtle subjec-
tive categories is required to measure them empirically (Lutz
et al., 2002). However, because variability in the experience
of TUT showed a pattern suggestive of better performance
and superior monitoring, it is possible that individuals who
are high on mean levels of TUT and lack variance reflect
a population for whom self-generated thoughts are especially
sticky and hence problematic. While we note that a limitation
of the present design is a lack of validation for the stickiness
measure, future methodological research should consider this
possibility.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our findings confirm previous work suggesting
that TUTs interfere with task performance under demanding task
conditions. In addition, we found novel evidence that variability
in mind-wandering experience related to greater metacognitive
ability, suggesting a role for online monitoring in ensuring flex-
ibility in the manner that attention is deployed on both external
and self-generated sources of information. We observed activa-
tions of both default mode and salience networks during error
monitoring, a finding in line with the observation that particu-
lar aspects of mind-wandering are related to self-monitoring. We
also found that ventral regions of the mPFC increased activity as
TUT increased, while more dorsal regions were deactivated when
individuals engaged cognitive control, a finding broadly in line
with a component process view of the DMN. Given these results
we recommend that a time series analysis of subjective variability
with continuous self-report measures, or investigation of second-
order confidence in TUT ratings, may reveal further granularity
in the experience of mind-wandering and related contributions
to behavioral performance. Such approaches may prove impor-
tant in determining the extent to which individuals regulate the
balance of conscious thought so as to maximize the benefits of
self-generated thought, while simultaneously limiting its costs.
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